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COMMUNITY RULES OF COMPETITION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of the European Economic Community
(EEC) in the 1957 Treaty of Rome,' the Member States have recognized that activities to restrict competition and abuses of dominant positions in business could seriously hinder the free flow of
goods and services and the creation of a common market within the
Community. The Treaty of Rome provides that one activity of the
Community shall be "the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the Common Market is not distorted."2 Articles 85
and 86 form the basis of this system. Article 85 contemplates control of cartels and concerted anticompetitive practices. Article 86
concerns abuses of dominant positions or monopolies. The European Communities Council, the principal legislative body of the
EEC, is required to promulgate regulations3 effecting the principles of articles 85 and 86. The Commission, the chief executive
body of the EEC, is directed to apply those regulations and to
investigate and control possible infringements. 4 Decisions of the
Commission may be appealed directly to the Court of Justice.5
After a period of adjustment and organization for the Community, the Council in 1962 adopted Regulation 17/62,6 the initial
implementation of articles 85 and 86. The Regulation provides that
violations of those articles are punishable by fines7 and penalties.'
In addition to the Commission's enforcement of the competition
rules, Regulation 17/62 authorizes the Member States to take
action if the Commission has not instituted proceedings.9
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), March
25, 1957. The authoritative English text of the treaty may be found in TREATIES
ESTABUSHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITES (Office of Official Publications of the

European Communities,1973). An unofficial English text may be found in 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
2. EEC art. 3(f).
3. EEC art. 87.
4. EEC art. 89. The Commission may also issue regulations pursuant to authority delegated by the Council. See note 43 infra.
5. Council Regulation No. 17/62 [hereinafter cited as Reg. 17/62], as
amended by Council Regulation No. 59/62, art. 17, [1962] Official Journal of the
European Communities 204, 1655 [hereinafter cited as J.O.], 1 CCH Comm.
MKT. REP.
2401-2634.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. Reg. 17/62, art. 15. The Court of Justice may cancel, reduce, or increase a
fine or penalty imposed by the Commission. Reg. 17/62, art. 17.
8. Reg. 17/62, art. 16.
9. Reg. 17/62, art. 9(3).
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IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 85

The most important of article 85's three sections is 85(1), which
designates prohibited activities."0 A violation of that section results
from an agreement, a decision of an association," or a concerted
practice that includes more than one "undertaking"'" and that has
an effect on inter-Member trade. In addition, the activity in question must have the object or effect of preventing, restricting, or
distorting competition within the Community. Agreements or decisions of associations may be written or oral, 3 but if an oral agreement exists that cannot be proved, then the "concerted practice"
provision can often be used to find a violation. The Analine Dyes
Cartel case 4 (Dyestuffs case) turned on such a use: price increases
by ten dyestuffs manufacturers were held to violate article 85(1),
and the existence of an agreement did not have to be proved. 5
Although conscious parallelism and price leadership are not prohibited by article 85(1)16 the similarity in method, manner, and
substance of the price increases by the manufacturers led the
Court of Justice to conclude that such practices are concerted.
Article 85(1) applies only to trade between Member States, leaving regulation of intrastate trade to competition law of the Member

States."5 For instance in the Cobelaz Agreement (No. 1) decision, 0
10. EEC art. 85(1) provides in part:
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market ... "
11. An example of an "association of undertakings" as referred to in article
85(1) is the trade association.
12. Although not defined in the Treaty of Rome or regulations, "undertaking"
seems to include all legally recognized types of economic units, such as individuals carrying on a business, partnerships, companies, corporations, statutory bodies, government authorities carrying on a business, charities which are trading,
cooperative groups, etc. J. CUNNINGHAM, THE CoM'TrMON LAW OF THE EEC 47

(1973) [hereinafter cited as

CUNNINGHAM].

13. Omega Watches Decision, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D49 (1970).
14. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 18 Recueil 619, 2 CCH
Comm. MKT.REP. 8161, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
15. 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8161 at 8026-27, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 632.
16. See generally J. CUNNINGHAM, REsTRIcrIvE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES IN
EEC LAW 18 (1973); Note, Uniform Pricing in Concentrated Markets: Is Conscious Parallelism Prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome?, 7 CORN.
INT'L L.J. 113 (1974).
17. 2 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. 8161 at 8027, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 622-23.
18. For a summary of Member State competition law see 1 CCH CoMM. MKT.
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Belgian fertilizer manufacturers established a joint sales office to
handle their sales within Belgium and in non-member nations.
Because each manufacturer was free to decide what quantity to sell
in other Member States, inter-Member trade was not affected and
no violation occurred.
Concerning agreements, decisions of associations, or concerted
practices among operations in countries outside the Community,
the Commission has ruled that when the effects of the actions were
felt within the EEC, the foreign enterprises could be fined." In
simpler words, the Commission holds that jurisdiction is present
whenever the requirements for a violation are otherwise met. The
Court of Justice, however, has yet to accept such a liberal extraterritorial approach.' The Court of Justice has upheld, however, the
"economic unity" or "enterprise entity" test, whereby acts of subsidiaries located within the Community are attributable to nonEEC parent companies. 2 The economic unity test also is applied
in article 85 cases to determine if more than one undertaking is
involved. For example, in the Christiani& Nielson N. V. decision,"
a Danish company agreed not to compete in the Netherlands with
its Dutch subsidiary, and the subsidiary agreed not to compete in
countries where the parent or another subsidiary was operating.
The Commission saw the division of markets simply as a distribution of functions within the same economic unit.
The effect of the agreement, decision of associations, or concerted practice must not only be upon inter-Member trade and
competition, but also be appreciable.24 The rule is known as the
REP. 2003.03 (1971) and CUNNINGHAM, note 12 supra, at 36-38.
19. 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45 (1968).
20. Analine Dyes Cartel Decision, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D23 (1969).
21. In the appeal of the Analine Dyes Cartel Decision, supra note 14, by
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI), a member of the cartel located outside
the EEC, the Court of Justice avoided affirming the reasoning of the Commission
by holding that actions of ICI's subsidiaries within the EEC were attributable to
ICI (economic unity or enterprise entity theory). Consequently, ICI was considered to have acted within the Community and thereby subject to article 85(1).
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 18 Recueil 619, 2 CCH Comm.
MKT. REP.
8161, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
22. See note 12 supra and Beguelin Import Co. v. G. L. Import Export S.A.,
17 Recueil 949, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8149, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81 (1971).
23. 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D36 (1969).
24. The operative definition of "appreciable" was established by the Commission in Notice Concerning Minor Agreements (1970), 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
2700 (1971). The Notice provides that if the products to which the agreement,
decision, or concerted practice relates do not exceed 5 per cent of the market and
if the total annual turnover of the undertakings involved does not exceed 15
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doctrine of effet sensible, 25 exemplified by the Commission's ruling
in the SOCEMAS decision.26 SOCEMAS was a cooperative import
agency established by a group of French food chain stores. In one
year, the imports arranged by SOCEMAS amounted to only 0.1
per cent of the store's turnover, and SOCEMAS' imports from
other EEC nations never exceeded one per cent of any one Member

State's production.2 Consequently, SOCEMAS did not produce
any "noticable effects" upon inter-Member trade." Agreements
that do not pass the qualitative standards set by the Commission
may still beviewed as having no appreciable effect, but must be
considered individually.23
Article 85(1) indicates five types of restraint upon competition
that are prohibited." This list, however, is not intended to be
exclusive. For example, a profit-pooling scheme in the Belgaphos
decision 3 was held to fall within article 85(1). A useful reference
in determining whether an activity restricts competition is the
Commission's Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted
2
Practices Concerning Cooperation between Enterprises,1
which
lists seventeen kinds of activity that the Commission does not
consider as restricting competition.33
million "units of account" (or 20 million in the case of non-manufacturing undertakings), the agreement does not fall within article 85(1). A "unit of account" is
fixed at 0.88867088 grams of fine gold equivalent to one American dollar until the
1971 devaluation. Id. at %5042.01.
25. The phrase means "an effect which can be felt."
26. SOCEMAS Decision, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D28 (1968).
27. 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D28.
28. 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D28.
29. This refers to the process known as "negative clearance." See notes 38-40
infra and accompanying text.
30. Article 85(1) prohibits in particular those agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which:
"(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts."
31. Belgaphos Decision, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 9382 (1970).
32. 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 2699 (1971).
33. Because some of the 17 activities may fall within article 85(1) under certain circumstances, negative clearance should be sought. For instance, an exchange of information about orders, turnover, investment, or prices may consti-
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The Commission may impose substantial fines for infringements
of article 85(1) whether the infringements were intentional or due
to negligence.3 4 Furthermore, the Commission is empowered to
impose penalties on firms that continue an infringement after a
formal Commission decision has required its termination.' 5 There
also may be parallel fines or penalties levied for the same activities
by Member States.3 1 In addition, article 85(2) declares that
"[a]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void." The procedure is termed "avoidance". When it is possible to sever an agreement into distinct,
independent parts, only those parts of the agreement infringing
upon article 85(1) will be avoided."
Since the consequences for violating article 85(1) are serious,
most companies want to know whether their proposed actions
come within the terms of the article. Regulation 17/62 allows the
Commission to review a proposed action and state whether that
particular activity is within the scope of article 85(1) .31 A declaration favorable to the undertaking is called a "negative clearance."39
In addition to individual negative clearances, the Commission has
issued four notices that are commonly referred to as "bloc" negative clearances, although they are nonbinding on bodies other than
the Commission."
If an agreement, decision of an association, or concerted practice
is refused negative clearance and is ruled to be prohibited by article 85(1), the action may still qualify for exemption under article
85(3). An exemption will be granted if the agreement, decision, or
tute infringements of 85(1) because restraint of competition may occur in
oligopolistic situations relating to homogeneous products. 1 CCH Comm. MKT.
REP. 2699 at 1848 (1971).
34. Reg. 17/62, art. 15. Fines may range from 1,000 to 1,000,000 units of account as defined in note 24 supra, or 10 percent of the undertaking's turnover in
the last financial year, whichever is greater. For a multi-product firm, the latter
penalty can be particularly serious.
35. Reg. 17/62, art. 16. For each day the infringement is continued after the
date fixed by the Commission decision, the Commission's fine may range from
50 to 1,000 units of account as defined in note 24 supra.
36. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 18 Recuei 619, 2 CCH
CoMm. MKT.REP. 8161, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Socit6 Technique Minifre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 12
Recueil 337, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8047, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357 (1966).
38. Reg. 17/62, art. 2.
39. See, e.g., Kodak Decision, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D19 (1970); Grosfillex
Decision, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 237 (1964).
40. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 12, at 78.
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concerted practice improves the production or distribution of
goods or promotes technical or economic progress, if consumers are
allowed a fair share of the benefits, if there are no unnecessary
restrictions, and if competition is not eliminated." To procure an
exemption, the Commission must be notified concerning the existence of an anticompetitive agreement" unless the agreement falls
within a "bloc" or "group" exemption43 or within one of the categories excused by Regulation 17/62 from the obligation to notify. 4
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE

86

A. Abuse of a DominantPosition
For a violation of article 86 to occur one or more enterprises must
abuse a dominant position within the EEC or a substantial part
of the EEC, and that abuse must be capable of affecting
inter-Member trade." Neither article 86 nor Regulation 17/62 defines "dominant position", but the concept is analyzed by James
Cunningham, who delineates three criteria for that determination:
41. EEC art. 85(3) provides:
"The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production of distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question."
42. Reg. 17/62, art. 4.
43. Article 85(3), supra note 41, provides not only for individual exemptions
but also categorical exemptions. The Council has issued two regulations conferring on the Commission the power to make exempting regulations in respect of
five categories of agreements. Council Regulation 19/65, 1965 J.O. 533, 1 CCH
CoMm. MKT. REP. 2717 (1971); Council Regulation 2821/71, 1 CCH Comm. MKT.
REP. 2729 (1973). The Commission has exercised its authority for two of the five
categories. Commission Regulation 67/67, 1967 J.O. 849, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2727 (1973) (exclusive distributorship agreements); Commission Regulation
2779/72, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 2731 (1973) (specialization agreements).
44. Reg. 17/62, art. 4(2).
45. EEC Art. 86 provides in part: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of
a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall
be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect
trade between Member States."
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(1) the ability to influence the market significantly; (2) the ability
to act independently of the reactions of others; and (3) the realization by the firm that it is in a dominant position and able to
exercise a significant influence. " Article 86 indicates potentially
abusive practices as unfair prices or terms, production restrictions,
discriminatory dealings, and irrelevant tying arrangements." A
1966 Commission study" includes price cutting, either for the purpose of eliminating a weaker competitor who cannot withstand a
long period of sales below cost or for the purpose of forcing a merger
on an unwilling party or a merger on unfavorable terms, as an
abusive practice. An "undertaking" is defined as in article 85 . 4 A
minimum size for a "substantial part" of the Common Market has
yet to be established; there is no requirement, however, that the
"part" span the borders of more than one Member State." In addition, the effect upon inter-Member trade may be actual"' or potential. 52
B.

Mergers

Neither article 85 nor article 86 specifically refer to mergers,
reflecting the traditional lack of antimerger sentiment in the
EEC.5" Nevertheless, a 1966 Commission memorandum,
46.

CUNNInGHAM,

supra note 12, at 102.

47. EEC art. 86 provides in part:
"Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts."
48. Commission Memorandum, Concentration of Firms in the Common
Market, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 9081 (1966).
49. See note 12 supra.
50. See, e.g., GEMA (No. 1) Decision, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D35 (1971).
51. GEMA (No. 1) Decision, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D35 (1971).
52. Continental Can Co. Decision, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 9481, 11 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. Dl (1972).
53. An exception is article 66 of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) Treaty which requires prior Commission approval for any merger involving one or more firms engaged in the coal and steel industry within the EEC.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,
article 66. The authentic English text may be found in TRETms EsTABLiSmNG THE
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Concentrationof Firms in the Common Market,-4 considered the
application of these articles to mergers. The report stated that
article 85 was not suited for controlling mergers but that an
"abuse" under article 86 was committed by the elimination of
competition through a merger, and if a firm in a dominant position
were involved, article 86 might apply. In 1971, the Commission
applied this theory and ruled that the Continental Can Company,
a United States corporation, violated article 86 by acquiring,
through a subsidiary holding company, Europemballage Corporation, a Dutch enterprise, Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa N.V.
(TDV).55 The Commission found that Continental Can occupied a
dominant position in a substantial part of the EEC market for
light containers through its German subsidiary, SchmalbachLubeca-Werke (SLW), and that the purchase of TDV was an
"abuse" of that position because it resulted in the elimination of
potential competition for the containers in a substantial part of the
Common Market. 6 On appeal to the Court of Justice,57 the decision was reversed on its facts; however, the Court affirmed the
Commission's conclusions of law.
Recognizing the inadequacy of an article not designed to control
mergers being used for such purposes (i.e., one of the merging
parties must be in a dominant position before the merger, or an
article 86 abuse cannot occur), the Commission undertook the formulation of a regulation for the systematic control of mergers using
article 3(f) as the primary legal basis. 8 The final draft of the proposed merger control regulation was issued July 18, 1973.11 If approved, it would render unnecessary the strained reasoning of the
Continental Can decision, which derived merger control from an
article never designed for such a use. Much broader than article
86, the proposed regulation provides that concentrations that in13 (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1973). An unofficial English text appears in 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 199-205
(1957). For a summary of merger control under the ECSC Treaty see Markert
Antitrust Aspects of Mergers in the EEC, 5 TExAs INT'L L.F. 32, 27-46 (1969).
54. See note 48 supra.
55. Continental Can Co. Decision, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9481, 11 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. Dll (1972).
56. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9481 at 9029-30, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D13.
57. Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission [1973]
European Court Reports 215 [hereinafter cited as E.C.R.], 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 8171, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
58. EEC art. 3(f) provides for "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted."
59. 2 CCH Comm. Micr. REP. 9586 (1973).
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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clude at least one enterprise within the Common Market and that
create the power to hinder effective competition, are incompatible
with the Common Market.6" The new regulation would not entirely
reject the EEC's traditional pro-merger attitude as even large concentrations are exempted when they are "indispensable to the attainment" of Community objectives.' In addition, mergers among
small and medium-sized firms are exempted in order to be compet62
itive on the world market.

IV.

RECENT DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE

A.

Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano, SpA and Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Commission3
The case of Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano, SpA (ICI) and
Commercial Solvents Corp. (CSC) v. Commission provides a recent example of how a violation of article 86 is established. The
Court upheld an earlier decision of the Commission64 that CSC, an
American firm, had violated article 86 by abusing its dominant
position in the market of intermediate chemical products for an
antituberculosis drug, ethambutol. The intermediate products
required for the manufacture of ethambutol and related specialities are nitropropane and aminobutanol, for which CSC had a
world monopoly. ICI is an Italian chemical firm 51 per cent owned
by CSC, and, until 1970, ICI sold CSC-manufactured aminobutanol to Laboratoria Chemiro Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja, SpA
(Zoja) and other drug manufacturers. In 1970 ICI began to produce
ethambutol and ethambutol-based specialities. Shortly thereafter,
CSC decided for commercial and technical reasons to stop
supplying nitropropane and aminobutanol to the EEC nations and
to provide ICI with another intermediary, which ICI could still
process into bulk ethambutol specialties. On the world market,
Zoja could not obtain aminobutanol from any company other than
CSC, and CSC would not sell; consequently, Zoja was eliminated
as a major manufacturer of ethambutol and as a competitor of
60. 2 CCH CoMm. MET. REP. 9586 at 9303 (1973). See Note, The Emergence
of a Common Market Merger Control Policy: The Aftermath of Continental
Can-The ProposedEEC Merger Control Regulation,7 CORN. INT'L L.J. 131, 14047 (1974).
61. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586 at 9303 (1973).
62. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586 at 9303 (1973).
63. [1974] E.C.R. 223, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
309 (1974).
64. ICI Decision, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D50 (1973).
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CSC-ICI. Zoja subsequently requested the Commission to institute
proceedings against CSC and ICI for infringements of article 86.
The Commission agreed and ordered CSC to supply Zoja with the
necessary quantities of aminobutanol and to submit proposals for
supplying Zoja in the future." CSC and ICI filed applications for
annulment of the decision, and the judgment of the Court of Justice was handed down pursuant to the joinder of the two cases.
CSC submitted that it could not be held responsible for any
activities of ICI because the requirement of the economic unity
test" was not met. According to the Analine Dyes Cartel case,6" for
the acts of a subsidiary to be attributed to the parent company,
there must be: (a) power of the parent company to direct the
subsidiary and (b) the actual exercise of the parent's control to
such an extent that the subsidiary does not determine its behavior
on the market in an autonomous manner. 8 Although the companies might have acted independently, the Court held that "as regards their relations with Zoja the two companies must be deemed
an economic unit"" for purposes of determining liability.
To determine whether an article 86 violation existed, the Court
examined the following questions: (1) which market to consider,
(2) whether there was a dominant position within the meaning of
article 86, (3) whether there had been an abuse of such a position,
and (4) whether such abuse might have affected trade between
Member States.
1. Market to be Considered.-The applicants contended that
the Commission had used only the market for ethambutol to determine whether an abuse of a dominant position existed." The Court
held, however, that the Commission had correctly examined that
narrow market only to gain perspective of the effects of the alleged
misconduct in the entire raw materials market (nitropropane and
aminobutanol), the market that must be considered for article 86
purposes.7 The Court then rejected the applicants' argument that
65. 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D62.
66. See notes 22, 23 supra and accompanying text.
67. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 18 Recueil 619, 2 CCH
Comm.MKT. REP.

8161, 11 Coim. MKT.

68. 2 CCH Comm.MKT. REP.

L.R. 557 (1972).

8161 at 8031, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 629.

69. ICI & CSC v. Commission, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 254, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT.
REP. 8209 at 8821, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309, 344 (1974).
70. Ethambutol is only part of a larger competitive market in largely

interchangeable anti-tuberculin drugs.
71.

[1974] E.C.R. at 249, 2 CCH COMm. MKT.REP.

Mkt. L.R. at 339.

8209 at 8819, 13 Comm.
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it was impossible to distinguish the market in a necessary raw
material from the market in which the end product was sold.72
2. Dominant Position.-The applicants disputed the Commission's findings that in the Common Market CSC-ICI held a dominant position over the raw material necessary for the manufacture
of ethambutol on the grounds that other substitute raw materials
were available. The Court found, however, that the alternative
processes were either too experimental or insufficiently productive
to satisfy Zoja's demand. Hence, a dominant position was occu73
pied.
3. Abuse of the Dominant Position.-The Court ascertained
that CSC-ICI refused to supply Zoja in order to reserve raw materials for its own manufacture of derivatives. Since Zoja is a major
competing manufacturer of these derivatives, and CSC-ICI is the
only source of the requisite raw materials, the refusal to supply was
an attempt to eliminate competition by a major competitor; this
was held to be an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning
of article 86.11
4. Effect on Trade between the Member States.-The applicants argued reasonably that primarily the world market was affected by the refusal to sell, because Zoja sells 90 per cent of its
production outside the Common Market. But the Court interpreted article 86 to prohibit abuses that may directly or indirectly
prejudice EEC consumers by impairing the competitive structure
decreed by article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty. 5 Therefore, the Court
declared that Community authorities must consider all the effects
of the alleged practices on the competitive structure of the EEC
without distinguishing between production intended for sale
within the EEC and production intended for export. 76 The Court
then held that when a business in a dominant position within the
EEC has abused its position in such a way that a competitor in
the Common Market is likely to be eliminated with repercussions
on the competitive structure within the EEC, it does not matter
72. [1974] E.C.R. at 249, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8819, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 339.
73. [1974] E.C.R. at 248, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8818-20, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 338.
74. [1974] E.C.R. at 251, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8819-20, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 340-41.
75. [1974] E.C.R. at 252, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8820-21, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342.
76. [1974] E.C. R. at 252, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8821, 13 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 342.
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whether the violative conduct relates to the competitor's exports
or to its intra-Community trade.77
B.

Ex Parte Sacchill

In addition to its interpretation of article 86, Sacchi construes a
less well-known provision of EEC competition law, article 90.79 The
Italian Government had granted a television monopoly to Radio
Andizione Italiano (RAI), which included the monopoly on televised advertising and prohibited any person or enterprise from
receiving for retransmission audio-visual signals transmitted from
Italy or any other nation. Giuseppe Sacchi, who owns an unauthorized cable television relay company (Telebiella) was brought before the Tribunale of Biella for refusing to pay license fees on
television relay receivers. The Italian court doubted the legality of
the fee should the RAI monopoly be contrary to the EEC Treaty.
Therefore, the Tribunale referred numerous questions regarding
articles 86 and 90 to the Court of Justice for preliminary interpretation. Sacchi argued that under article 90(1) RAI was a public
enterprise granted special or exclusive rights by a Member State
but nonetheless subject to the rules of the EEC Treaty. Not contending that RAI might be subject to article 90(2), Sacchi posited
that RAI had violated article 90(1) by abusing its dominant position within the meaning of article 86. He also asserted that since
by definition the monopoly involved the elimination of competition, abuse of dominant position arose from the mere existence of
the monopoly 0
77. [19741 E.C.R. at 252-53, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8209 at 8821, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342.
78. [1974] E.C.R. 409, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8267, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
177 (1974).
79. EEC art. 90 provides in part:
"1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in
so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law
or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade
must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of

the Community."
80.

[1974] E.C.R. at 423, 2 CCH CoMm.

Mkt. L.R. at 194.

MKT. REP.

8267 at 9184, 14 Comm.
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The Court did not agree with Sacchi's latter argument but did
leave open the possibility that the national court might find abuse
under article 86. The Court insisted that nothing in the EEC
Treaty, including article 86, prevents Member States, for
noneconomic considerations in the public interest, from removing
radio and television transmissions from the field of competition by
conferring on one or more establishments an exclusive right to
conduct them."1 Although a Member State may establish a monopoly for proper reasons and may place an enterprise in a dominant
position, that enterprise cannot abuse the position.8 2 The Court
suggested that, if they were true, accusations made before the
national court regarding unfair charges or conditions on users and
discrimination in advertising policies would be abusive of a dominant position.13 In addition, the Court held that the prohibitions
of article 86 directly affect cases such as this and confer on interested parties, like Sacchi, directly enforceable rights that the national courts must safeguard. 4
C. Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SABAM (BRT-I) 5
In BRT-I, the Court of Justice faced an article 86 case complicated by several questions of jurisdiction. The case arose out of
proceedings brought in 1969 before the Tribunal de premiere instance of Brussels by Belgische Radio en Televisie (BRT) and Societe Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM)
against the N.V. Fonior Company to prevent the latter from reproducing a song, the copyright of which had been assigned to
SABAM and BRT by the composer and script writer. The Brussels
court considered two questions regarding the interpretation of article 86: (1) whether an undertaking such as SABAM, which enjoys
81. [1974] E.C.R. at 429, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8267 at 9185-3, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 203.
82. [1974] E.C.R. at 430, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8267 at 9185-3,4, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 203-4.
8267 at 9185-4, 14
83. [19741 E.C.R. at 430, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. Ru.
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 204.
84. [1974] E.C.R. at 430, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8267 at 9185-4, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 204.
85. The facts, issues, and views of the parties are contained in the judgment
of January 30, 1974 (BRT-I), [1974] E.C.R. 51, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8268,
14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238 (1974), where the Court decided to hear the opinion of
the Advocate-General with regard to the merits of the case. The judgment on the
merits was handed down March 27, 1974 (BRT-ll), [1974] E.C.R. 313, 2 CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. 8269, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 282 (1974).
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de facto monopoly power over authors' rights in a Member State,
should be considered as constituting an abuse of a dominant position under article 86 because it requires the assignment of all copyrights without distinction; and (2) whether abuse of a dominant
position exists when an enterprise such as SABAM stipulates that
an author shall assign his present and future rights, and in particular when that enterprise may continue to exercise the assigned
rights for five years following the withdrawal of the members without having to account for its actions."6 For preliminary interpretations of the relevant EEC Treaty provisions, referral was made to
the Court of Justice.
Before the Court of Justice could answer the questions of the
Brussels court, a jurisdictional complication had to be solved. On
its own motion" in June 1970 the Commission had initiated a
procedure in regard to possible article 86 violations by SABAM. ss
The Commission objected to the articles of the association's contracts dealing with the global assignment of copyrights, to the
discrimination by SABAM against nationals of other Member
States, and to the duration (five years) of the control over rights
after the withdrawal of a member. According to Regulation 17/62,
the "authorities of the Member States" are bound to refrain from
all action in the competition law area if the Commission is conducting procedures or investigations under the Regulation. 9 The
question then was whether the Brussels court was a national "authority" within the meaning of Regulation 17/62; if it was, then the
substantive questions referred to the Court could not be answered
as the Brussels court would have to stay its proceedings. The Court
began its analysis by stating that the prohibitions of articles 85 and
86 produce direct effects in relations between individuals and,
therefore, create directly enforceable rights in those individuals
that national courts must safeguard. To use the Regulation 17/62
prohibition to deny national courts the jurisdiction to afford this
protection, the Court asserted, would mean depriving individuals
of rights that they hold under the EEC Treaty itself.8 " The Court
86. [19741 E.C.R. at 54, 2 CCH CoMm.

MKT.

REP.

8268 at 9185-16-17, 14

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 243.
87. See Reg. 17/62, art. 3.
8268 at 9185-16, 14
88. [1974] E.C.R. at 53, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 242.
89. Regulation 17/62 article 9(3) restrains national authorities from interfering
in Commission investigations initiated under articles 2, 3, or 6.
8268 at 9185-22, 14
90. [1974] E.C.R. at 63, 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP.
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 271.
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then held that even though the phrase "authorities of the Member
States"'" includes such entities as the Brussels court, national
courts could not be exempted from giving judgment when a direct
effect of article 86 was pleaded."
Three months later the Court ruled on the substantive questions
referred by the Belgian court.93 The Court held that if an undertaking such as SABAM imposed on its members obligations that were
not absolutely necessary for the attainment of its objectives and,
thus, encroached unfairly upon a member's freedom to exercise his
copyright, then the action could constitute an abuse.94 The Court
noted that the national court, if abusive practices were found,
would determine whether and to what extent they affected the
interests of authors or third parties concerned in order to decide
the validity and effect of the contracts (or certain provisions of the
contracts) in dispute.95 The Belgian court also asked whether
SABAM could qualify as an "undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest,"9 and thereby come
under article 90(2), which permits, under certain circumstances,
derogation from the rules of the EEC Treaty.9 7 The Court ruled
that an enterprise to which the Member State has not assigned any
task and that manages private interests, including intellectual
property rights protected by law, could not be an undertaking as
envisaged in article 90(2).
Charles A. Schliebs
91. Reg. 17/62, art. 9(3).
92. [1974] E.C.R. at 63, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8268 at 9185-22, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 271.
93. [1974] E.C.R. at 313, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8269, 14 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 282.
94. [1974] E.C.R. at 317, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8269 at 9185-38, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283-84.
95. [1974] E.C.R. at 317, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8269 at 9185-38, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283-84.
96. BRT-I, [1974] E.C.R. 51, 54, 2 CCH COMm. MKT. REP. 8268 at 918517, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238, 243 (1974).
97. EEC art. 90(2) quoted in note 79 supra.
98. BRT-II, [1974] E.C.R. 313, 318, 2 CCH CoM. MKT. REP. 8269 at 918538, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 282, 284 (1974).

